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A Phenomenological Interpretation of Religion via Pre-Socratic Thinking

Introduction:
What is religion? What does the concept of religion mean? Today, the word ‘religion’
appears everywhere; a seemingly all pervasive notion associated with a vast array of
phenomena, including: war, terrorism, politics, science fiction, morality, and of
course, with delusion and irrationality. However, what religion is, or what it means,
remains a highly contested matter. It will be the aim of this paper to offer an
interpretation of the meaning of the concept of religion by using just one of many
philosophical ways of approaching religion, namely; phenomenology as ontology.

The paper will focus upon the remaining fragments of three Pre-Socratic
philosophers; Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, seeking in these fragments
the basic conceptual subject matter for an interpretation of the meaning of religion. I
will argue that these fragments reveal that the meaning of religion is a relation
between being-human and what gets called the arche (or ground of being). Further, I
will argue that this relation can be conceptually determined as a quest for ground: the
ground of the human sense of being and of grounding thinking, meaning, truth, and
purpose…

Ultimately, I will argue in this paper that there are two essential characteristics of the
meaning of religion as this relation to ground(ing). First, insofar as religion belongs to
humans in our being; the meaning of religion may be characterized as the directedness of being-human towards meaning and purpose. Additionally, as with all
relationships, the relationship that constitutes religion has a ‘towards which’ – or – if
you will, a being that is related to. Thus, the second essential characteristic of religion
will be disclosed as the arche; that which is the ground of being and as such, that
which is otherwise than being.

Phenomenology as Ontology:
So, what do I mean by phenomenology as ontology? I suppose first, that a
phenomenology as ontology will be a way of doing philosophy loosely based upon
Martin Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology in such works as: Ontology – The
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Hermeneutics of Facticity, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and Being and
Time. I say ‘loosely based’ insofar as I don’t consider myself an orthodox
Heideggerian, and moreover, I would argue that there are major flaws in Heidegger’s
conception of religion.

Let me then outline what I mean by a phenomenology as ontology in more depth. I
think that the genius of Heidegger’s phenomenology is marked by two interrelated
realizations: first, that philosophy necessarily begins with the question of being, and
therein, that philosophy has no hope of thinking about being properly unless we first
address the question of how humans, in our being, are able to grasp the meaning of
being. These two interrelated realizations, I think, are most clearly expressed in the
introduction to Being and Time, where Heidegger states: ‘Inquiry itself is the
behaviour of a questioner, and therefore of an entity, and as such has its own
character of being’. 1

These interrelated realizations, I would argue, are the foundation of phenomenology
as ontology; providing phenomenology with two foundational tasks to fulfil. The first
task will be to provide an ontological analysis of the being of humans; therein
showing how it is possible for humans to grasp being, and equally, showing how it is
possible for humans to misunderstand or misinterpret being 2 . The second task facing
phenomenology will be to show how the being of an entity shows itself 3 . This second
task gives rise to the concept of phenomenon upon which phenomenology rests – that
is: the formal conception of the being of an entity as it shows itself. At this point,
however, the two tasks of phenomenology merge together – for the only way to
analyze the being of humans is on the basis of already, in advance, determining the
meaning of phenomenon 4 .

If we think about it, the meaning of phenomenon has already been implicitly
predetermined in Heidegger’s two realizations in relation to being. The first was that
philosophy is all about thinking being 5 . Thus, it follows that the concept of
phenomenon will refer to the being of an entity. 6 Accordingly, the task of
phenomenology is to work out how humans, in our being, grasp the being of entities.
It follows from this that the concept of phenomenon will signify the way in which
humans are able to grasp being. Thus, in both, the concept of phenomenon will be
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conceived of as the way in which humans grasp being in such a way that the being of
an entity shows itself. In other words, phenomenon signifies how grasping being
‘belongs-to’ the being of humans 7 .

Here, the phenomenon can be said to ‘belong-to’ the being of humans in two primary
ways: the human intuition of the being of an entity and accordingly, the way in which
humans interpret or misinterpret being. This is why, ultimately, phenomenology as
ontology is a hermeneutical method; a way of doing philosophy that prioritizes the
problem of interpreting being as the truth of being or the misinterpretation of being.

When we turn to the concept of religion as phenomenon it follows that a
phenomenological interpretation of religion will constitute the meaning of religion via
three primary questions. The first question will be: to which entity in its being does
religion belong to? In this respect, the initial answer will be: it is the human being to
whom the phenomenon of religion belongs to and as such, we can constitute the
meaning of religion as ‘belonging-to’ the being of humans. The second question
follows as a consequence of the first: what then are the characteristics of being human
that grounds religion as a phenomenon? The final question flows from the second:
what can we say about the meaning of religion insofar as it belongs-to the being of
humans in a positive way? These are the questions through which I will interpret the
fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides…

The Pre-Socratic Fragments:
To get to the heart of what is indicated about the meaning of religion in the PreSocratics, it will be necessary to first figure out what they thought about being and the
place of the concept of being in their thinking. What we will find in the fragments, I
would argue, is that being is characterized as a concept that underlies all thinking
about the truth of entities. However, the concept of being as such, is itself grounded
upon the concept of the arche or first principle. Simply put, for Anaximander,
Heraclitus, and Parmenides being and human thinking about entities are the same;
being is thinking the truth of entities. However, thinking in and of itself, they argue, is
founded upon that which is otherwise than being. This distinction, I will argue, tells
us what these pre-Socratic philosophers thought about the being of humans, and
therein, provides indications of the meaning of religion.
3

I will begin with the first fragment of Anaximander, which reads:
‘The apeiron is the principle of existing things; further, the source from which
existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return at their
destruction, according to necessity; for they give justice and make reparation to one
another for their injustice, according to the arrangement of time’ 8

What then do these fragments tell us? This, of course, rests upon the contentious
question of what Anaximander meant by the apeiron. I would argue that the notion of
apeiron may be characterized as a formal title for arche. In this respect, the apeiron
certainly signifies the philosophical notion of arche, but additionally, does so in its
own way wherein the term apeiron has priority over the term arche. In other words,
the apeiron signifies arche, not in reference to being, but rather in the sense implicit
to the word ‘a-peiron’.

Etymologically, apeiron means literally ‘lack of bounds’. A conceptually consistent
interpretation of this term, based upon its use in the fragments, reveals the meaning of
the apeiron to be something like absence of bounded-ness, absence of physical
properties, and further, absence of any physical qualities that can be thought. In this
sense, the apeiron is given an interpretation consistent with its use in the fragments as
a name for the arche, wherein arche signifies the absence of physical characteristics
or knowable attributes in relation to the physical world.

This general view of the apeiron is evidenced in the attributes Anaximander gives to
it elsewhere in the fragments. Initially, the apeiron is given the attribute of
‘surrounding’. It is not consistent, then, to posit that there is some stuff that surrounds
the physical; for in being physical the apeiron could no longer surround. Rather, the
attribute of surrounding has the character of binding or holding together as something
other than the physical that determines the physical. As such, surrounding belongs ‘to
some other indeterminable physis’ 9 .

The use of this phrase: ‘some other apeiron physis’ reveals precisely the problem
Anaximander faces in what is sought and the way it is thought. For, the dilemma
revealed therein is of how to discuss a non-physical conception of the arche without
4

utilizing physically loaded terminology. This task is in one sense impossible, for the
very term a-peiron itself points to the non-physical via the physical. The absence, or
negation, of the physical is conceived of in apeiron as that which lacks boundaries.
The physical therein, is posited essentially as that with boundaries or that which is
bound.

An attribute associated with the apeiron through justice is steering. Herein, a careful
analysis of the fragments reveals in justice a notion of that which stands outside of the
spatio-temporal order of things. Fragment one discusses the activities of things as just
or unjust from which, by necessity, gets played out in time and according to the
measure of time 10 . However, justice and injustice are not determined by the things
involved or by the measure of time. Rather, time is the realm through which things are
subjected to justice in its effects or its judgments. Thus, time and physis in their unity
is the realm of the effects of justice and is a realm wherein justice steers.

For, Anaximander justice does not belong to the thing in its being nor the spatiotemporal realm. It follows that the correlation of arche and justice reveals itself
somehow in the relation of the proper and becoming/destruction. Becoming and
destruction, herein, are subservient to the arche. The arche forms a process of effect
within time as the ground of becoming and destruction. As such, justice indicates
something about the apeiron in the idea of the proper, referring somehow to the
significance of things in their presence and absence.

As steering, the apeiron is also associated with the attribute of the divine. This
attribution of the divine is reinforced in fragments two and three. In this, the notion of
the apeiron is given a number of divine characteristics: everlasting, ageless, immortal
and indestructible. Again, these characteristics that attribute divinity to the apeiron
are achieved through the rebuttal of the physical, or in opposition to the spatiotemporal realm.

In fragment two, the apeiron is given attributes signifying non-temporality. Herein,
the eternal (αει) is only coherent when interpreted as signifying the negation of time.
Likewise, to be ageless signifies not having an age: the absence of temporal existence.
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In fragment three, the apeiron is characterized as non-physical; of not ceasing and
thus of never becoming. In the same way, the indestructibility of the apeiron only
holds conceptual coherence where it signifies a never having become, for everything
that is physical becomes towards destruction, by necessity within time.

In the fragments, we can see that Anaximander provides an argument in which being
and the arche (as the apeiron) are conceived of as radically different. For
Anaximander, the meaning of being is the truth of physis, or, the truth of existent
entities in the world. Being, as such, is constituted as that which is bound or limited.
In contrast, the arche is constituted through the special features of the apeiron; the unbounded ground of the world and the entities within it. The apeiron, as such, is given
both a negative and positive characterization. Negatively, the apeiron is the alwaysabsent ground of all that is. Accordingly, the positive character of the apeiron is
revealed as justice and purpose; the significance of entities in their relations of
becoming and destruction.

When we turn to the fragments of Heraclitus we find a radical distinction between the
arche and being. Here, Heraclitus provides justification for this distinction via the
discussion of being as becoming and the distinction between the ordered and merely
physical universe.

In Heraclitus’ fragments, that which could be called being is becoming. Various
fragments discuss becoming as a process of change either in relation to the mutual
becoming of opposites 11 or in relation to the idea of the constant flux of the
constitution of entities. 12 As such, the notion of becoming refers to both the unity of
opposites and the idea of change in general. However, a closer perusal of the
fragments discloses becoming as a secondary phenomenon to the arche.

In fragment one, becoming is clearly formulated as secondary to the logos, for, the
becoming of entities is subservient to the logos. Likewise, Heraclitus posits the logos
as the arche: ‘for all things become in accordance with the logos’. 13 In this respect,
Heraclitus is providing a distinction between the logos as arche and becoming as that
which constitutes entities and as the formal ground of entities. Thus, for Heraclitus the
notion of the arche is the logos.
6

An example of the distinction between arche and being is provided via comparison of
fragments 30 and 124. In fragment thirty, Heraclitus states that: ‘this ordered cosmos,
which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it
was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire…’ 14 The traditional interpretation of this
fragment is, generally, that it signifies an identity of the physical as a unified whole in
elemental fire. In other words, fire is the basic constituent of the physical cosmos.
However, the cosmos as merely physical is also characterized by Heraclitus in
fragment 124. Here, Heraclitus states: ‘the fairest cosmos is but a dust-heap piled up
at random.’ 15 So, the distinction posited is between a merely physical cosmos and a
cosmos ordered and common to all.

Fragment 124 is Heraclitus’ description of the cosmos as merely physical. Further,
this fragment pertains to the conceptualization of reality as merely physical and the
result of thinking of reality as the unity of that which constitutes entities. In other
words, I would argue, fragment 124 is Heraclitus’ view of the result and point of
origin of thinking about reality with regard to the merely physical, and further, any
thinking that prioritizes the question of that which constitutes entities in their
presence, i.e., being.

Fragment 30 in comparison reveals Heraclitus’ view of the proper notion of cosmos.
Herein, the physical and becoming (being) is characterized implicitly as secondary to
‘order’. The phrase ‘ordered cosmos’ signifies the priority of that which orders and
that which is common to all. As such, fragment 30 conceptualizes the cosmos in
relation to that which orders it: the logos. Thus, the statement ‘this ordered cosmos…
was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire’ 16 does not refer to the physical
constitution of the cosmos, but rather, names that which orders the cosmos: the logos
is named ‘Pyr aei-zoon’.

It is clear, at this point, that the fragments of Heraclitus posit a distinction between the
concepts of being (as becoming) and the arche (as the logos). The arche, as such, is
the primary phenomenon sought by Heraclitus, and is viewed as the proper task of
thinking. The question remains, then, of what general task Heraclitus takes up in
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seeking to characterize the arche as logos and Pyr aei-zoon? In other words, how does
Heraclitus generally characterize the arche?

In the first instance, ‘Pyr aei zoon’ implicitly signifies the idea of the divine but also
has the explicit signification of Zeus. The notion of ‘Pyr aei-zoon’, as such, can be
discussed in relation to the general notion of the divine, mythical thinking about the
divine, and the identity of Zeus.

The general notion of the divine derived from the term Pyr aei-zoon contains three
characteristics; Pyr, aei, and zoon. In this, Pyr could signify fire, ether or soul. Insofar
as Pyr as fire is a determinate element, the signification of fire cannot be construed as
primary in this case. For, fragment 30 is not an argument pertaining to the elemental
constitution of the physical realm, but rather, refers to Pyr as the arche of the ordered
cosmos. Likewise, Pyr as ether cannot be the primary sense in this case, insofar as it
pertains to the physical and not to the arche. Equally, both fire and ether are shown to
lack primacy in this expression ‘Pyr aei-zoon’ insofar as neither can be properly
conceived of as ever living. Fire as an element is constantly transformed and subject
to becoming and destruction. This is also the case for ether as physical; for everything
physical is subject to becoming and destruction. This leaves the third sense of Pyr; of
soul or thinking. This makes a great deal of sense insofar as soul/intelligence and Pyr
are associated with the divine potentiality of humans and the divine in general.

The term ‘eternal’ is also in Greek thought associated with the general notion of the
divine, in this case, referring to the non-spatio-temporal character of the divine. I
would argue, moreover, that ‘eternal’ means always-absence (non-presence) rather
than always-presence as in Aristotle. This follows Heraclitus’ argument in fragment
one that thinking about that which constitutes things and how they are made is an
improper path of thought. If it is improper to distinguish between things on the basis
of their constitution as present, it is also improper to characterize the divine and arche
with regard to physis or in relation to being. Thus, it is not possible for ‘aei’ to signify
always-present, but rather, ‘eternal’ must signify an always-absence: an otherwise
than being.
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The term ‘zoon’ signifies life. In this, life is no mere existence or actuality. Life, in
this sense, cannot be construed as some quantifiable living, e.g., living for 50 years.
Rather, the signification of life is one of quality: of what sort of living, or, of what
characterizes the living as a life. As such, the living immediately refers to ‘aei’ as a
way of living: a character of living that is always-absence. Thus, the general notion of
the divine is formulated as an always-absent living, or, a way of life that is never
actualized in physis (becoming-destruction).

Bringing the phrase ‘Pyr aei-zoon’ together as a unity reveals its meaning as a way of
living soul/thinking that is otherwise than physis, and is never actualized in physis as
an entity. In this, the general notion of the divine shows itself as a way of living with
the attributes of soul/intelligence and always-absence. The general notion of the
divine, as such, also indicates something about Heraclitus’ notion of arche, namely:
that the arche is an always-absent intelligent/purposive life. Not an entity, but rather, a
way of living.

The phrase ‘Pyr aei-zoon’ is also connected to the divinity Zeus. Here, Pyr is
associated with Zeus. So also is zoon of which the name Zeus (Ζωος) is a derivative.
Further, Zeus is the highest Greek divinity and thus the divinity closest to the general
notion of the divine; Zeus in many respects exemplifies the idea of the divine. In
fragment 32, Heraclitus states, ‘that which alone is wise is one; it is willing and
unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.’ 17 In this respect, then, the name of Zeus
represents many attributes of the general notion of the divine, such as: Pyr, lightning,
life and wisdom. Thus, the name of Zeus indicates what the notion of the divine
properly signifies. However, the name Zeus is also a name of a divinity, that is, a
name of an entity that is present in the physical realm and within time. Equally, then,
the notion of the divine is also not Zeus, i.e., not an entity, nor a Greek divinity in a
theological and mythological sense. As such, the association of Zeus with ‘Pyr aei
zoon’ is both a positive and privative one. The association is positive insofar as Zeus
indicates something about the notion of the divine, and privative in the sense that
Zeus is an entity thought of as present in the physical realm.
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The next theme pertaining to Heraclitus’ notion of arche is logos. Herein, the arche is
disclosed as wisdom, or, the ground of thinking. Initially, Heraclitus posits the logos
as the central theme in a comparison between humans and the divine. In this, a
distinction is made between human logos as faulty and fallible 18 , while the divine is
logos itself. 19 Thus, Heraclitus utilizes the term logos in a derogatory sense in
fragment 87, stating: ‘A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at every logos.’ 20 In
comparison, the logos as divine is generally translated as ‘law’. 21 Thus, translation
issues aside, the use of logos in association with the divine shows itself as a proper or
necessary steering.

Another meaning of the logos for Heraclitus is its association with understanding and
wisdom. Again, a comparison is made between the divine and human logos. Thus, in
fragment 78 Heraclitus states: ‘Humans in our being have no power of understanding;
but the divine does.’ 22 Further, in fragment 32 the divine is characterized as the only
wise one, while fragments 28, 35, 56, 70 and 83 exemplify Heraclitus’ argument that
wisdom is an unusual state of human existence. Thus, in fragment 83 Heraclitus
pronounces: ‘The wisest human will appear an ape in relation to the divine.’ 23

Heraclitus also discusses the logos in itself. Here, there are three primary attributes of
the logos to be drawn out for examination. First, Heraclitus utilizes the term logos to
signify that which orders, as in fragments one and two. ‘The logos is as here
explained… all things come into being in accordance with this logos’ and ‘therefore
one must follow that which is common to all… the logos is universal…’ 24 Herein, the
logos signifies the arche of physis, and further, the ethical arche of human existence.
The logos, as such, turns back to the notion of divine justice, this time in the sense of
a communication or understanding of divine justice. In this way, the logos signifies
the communication of the divine through divine law and the potentiality of the divine
law to be understood by humans.

Additionally, the logos also signifies proper thinking. Initially, the logos signifies
truth: to understand the true purpose which steers. Thus, in fragment 50, Heraclitus
appeals to the logos as independent of human thinking: ‘When you have listened not
to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one’. This one-ness or
common-to-all is the disclosure of physis in its ordering (truth), and moreover, the
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awareness of the purpose of this ordering (meaning). Therefore, the logos signifies a
proper thinking that discloses the truth of physis, the purpose of physis, and the
purpose that directs everything.

The final and primary sense of logos given by Heraclitus is as the divine itself.
Herein, the logos is constituted as the communication of the divine, or, the way the
divine shows itself as the one, the common, and as that purpose that steers physis. As
such, the essential character of the logos is the divine: ‘the lord whose oracle is at
Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates.’ 25 Equally, this reveals the notion
of logos as arche; that for Heraclitus, the ground – its truth and proper meaning – is
always initially hidden from humans (always absent) and is only ever uncovered by
the difficult human pursuit of it and the way in which the divine communicates to
humans via indications. In this respect, the love physis has for hiding 26 refers to the
always-absent ground that orders physis rather than that which constitutes physis and
that which allows differentiation between things (being).

Thus, in general, the meaning of the divine in Heraclitus’ thinking shows itself as the
naming of the arche and further, through naming, the provision of positive attributes
of the arche. In this, calling the arche ‘the divine’ provides three positive indications
of the meaning of arche: 1. The arche is truth as it shows itself, or, the significance
and coherence of physis as it can be grasped. 2. The arche is ethos: the ground of the
proper of human existence. 3. The arche is the proper itself, or, the grasping and
showing itself of the arche as purpose and meaning.

In interpreting Parmenides’ fragments I will focus upon the two potential ways of
truth given by the goddess. The question to be addressed is that of the assumed
primacy of the first way of truth, i.e., being in relation to the arche. I will argue,
moreover, that it is the second way of truth (non-being) that indicates the notion of
arche properly in Parmenides thinking.

Paying close attention to the goddess’ address to Parmenides about the ways of truth
will provide an entrance into the notion of not-being. Initially, in fragment one, the
goddess states that Parmenides will inquire into everything: ‘both the motionless heart
of well-rounded truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true
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reliability.’ 27 Following this, in fragment two, the goddess tells Parmenides that there
are only two potential truthful ways of inquiry: either being (it is) and not-being (it is
not). The first, the path of being, is given the qualities of credibility and of following
truth. The second, of not-being, is a path not to be explored; unrecognizable and
inexpressible. Two points arise here. First, that the path of not-being is a way of truth
as one of the two truthful ways of inquiry. Alternatively, the second path is denied
insofar as it is not recognizable or expressible for humans.

The sense of this denial of pursuing not-being is, in fragment three, revealed via the
identity of being and thinking: ‘for it is the same thing to think and to be’. 28 In this,
the identity of thinking and being is founded upon the identity of a thing in its being.
Thus, the idea of being that is proposed here is that being is existential; referring to an
entity in its presence and being is that which presents an entity is its being. As such,
wherever thinking thinks being, it thinks an entity as present, or, in its presence. If
not-being is then pursued via this way of thinking, not-being is necessarily
impossible, for it is by definition not-present.

Fragment four reinforces this idea of thinking being as thinking presence, for the
present physical absence of a thing does not signify not-being or always-absence
insofar as the entity thought in its being is thought in relation to its constitution
(presence), or, what it is when it is present. Here, in fragment four, then, there are also
two characteristics of being: being is the always-presence of an entity and, moreover,
being is the unity of reality as presented and re-presentable. Thus, to think being is to
present and re-present the presence of an entity in its being.

Fragment six brings this initial conceptualization of being to its conclusion, and also
returns to the notion of not-being. In this, the notion of being is posited as that which
is possible: ‘one should say and think that being is; for to be is possible.’ 29 The
essence of being, as such, is the possible; the actual or potential presence of entities in
thinking being. In the second case, being as being-thought is restricted to that which is
possible; always-presence and the re-presentable. Accordingly, the goddess debars
Parmenides from thinking not-being, insofar as it is impossible. As impossible, notbeing can be characterized in two ways: as always-absent and impossible to think in
relation to presence.
12

In general then, the idea of being is revealed in the goddess’ statements to refer to the
idea of always-presence. Equally, then, the idea of being is restricted to the being of
an entity. That is, being signifies the characteristics of an entity as thought that are
always-present, founded upon the actuality of the entity as present at some point in
time or space. Further, being signifies a universal rule of thinking; that truthful
thinking about an entity, thinks the entity in its being – its constitution as alwayspresent. Finally, the idea of being also signifies the idea of a unified reality,
determined and determinable as a whole solely in relation to its characteristics of
always-presence.

In comparison, or in explicit relation to being, not-being is necessarily impossible.
Two themes are worthy of note here. First, not-being is only impossible in relation to
being and to a thinking that thinks the being of entities. It follows then that not-being
is impossible to think with regard to always-presence insofar as it is the irreconcilable
other to presence as always-absence. Does this mean that not-being must necessarily
be relegated to illusion or falsity? I would assert, rather, that in restricting being to the
idea of always-presence the goddess/Parmenides leaves open a path to not-being as
the idea of the arche of being-itself.

This path to not-being originates in fragment seven wherein the goddess states: ‘For
this can never predominate, that that which is not, exists.’ So, this statement indicates
two attributes of not-being: 1. that which is not cannot be thought of as an entity with
being, and 2. that which is not cannot be thought of as present insofar as it is alwaysabsent. At this point, we are left with a question, namely: given the initial description
of not-being as a path of truth what can we say about not-being in a positive sense?

Initially, Parmenides denies that being, as presence, springs from not-being. Here, the
denial refers explicitly to the notion of temporal creation or becoming. Thus, in the
first instance, being cannot be thought of as originating from not-being in a spatiotemporal sense. However, the next sentence provides a positive notion of not-being in
relation to being: ‘nor will the force of truth ever admit that anything should come
into being, beside being itself, out of not-being.’ 30 So, Parmenides’ goddess affirms
that being-itself (being-in-general) originates in not-being. Herein, the positive
13

characterization of not-being is revealed as the arche of being-itself. Thus,
Parmenides has opened a way into thinking non-being as the arche of being-itself, or,
the always-absent ground of being.
Furthermore, this statement provides the crucial distinction between the ways of truth
revealed by the goddess. Herein, the way of the truth of being signifies the truth of
entities in theirpresence and the knowable structure of the universe as always-present.
The second way of truth, as such, is disclosed as the truth of the arche; the question of
the ground of being itself as the characteristics of ‘that which is not’. Thus, even
though these characteristics of not-being cannot be grasped in relation to the presence
of entities nor their physical absence, not-being can be thought with regard to the
arche. The goddess, then, implicitly reveals the arche as not-being via three themes:
justice, logos, and the divine.

The first way that not-being shows itself is via justice. In fragment 7,8, immediately
following the previous statement, Parmenides goddess states: ‘so far as (not-being) is
concerned, justice has never released (being) in its fetters and set it free… but holds it
fast’. Here, the arche is given the attribute of justice: of binding being as being.
Again, later in this fragment the goddess states: ‘but it is motionless in the limits of
mighty bonds… for powerful necessity holds (being) in the bonds of a limit…’ 31
Thus, the arche shown in justice is something other than being that binds being.

Not-being also shows itself as the arche of logos or truth. Initially, it would seem that
the logos is being, especially in light of the goddess’ revelation that being and
thinking are the same. However, this statement cannot be taken literally to limit truth
to thinking being, nor, that being is the ground of truth. For, the identity of thinking
and being is only true in relation to thinking being and thinking the being of an entity.
Further, this identity of thinking and being is implicitly revealed as a characteristic of
human thinking in its potential for truth. This is evidenced throughout the fragments
insofar as the goddess consistently refers this rule to ‘you’ (the human thinker
Parmenides).

In this respect the communication of the goddess to Parmenides (the human ‘you’)
also reveals a distinction between the logos proper to philosophy, in thinking about
being, and the logos of truth belonging to the goddess: the ground of truth. This
14

distinction, I would argue, is one between the human capacity for philosophical truth
and the ground of truth as belonging to the goddess. For Parmenides, the goddess is
the truth insofar as she communicates the truth, but also is the ground of truth as the
one who reveals the truth. Moreover, the goddess reveals herself explicitly as
otherwise than the truth of being as the one who binds Parmenides thinking of being
to its truth: ‘come, I will tell you – and you must accept my logos when you have
heard it – the ways of inquiry which alone are to be thought…’ 32 Later, in fragment
two, the goddess states: ‘this I tell you is a path that cannot be explored (by you); for
you could neither recognize that which is not, nor express it.’ I would argue, here, that
the goddess is binding Parmenides to the proper way of thinking being for humans
rather than stating its absolute truth.

This brings us to the third way of characterizing the arche as not-being, i.e., as the
divine. Initially, this is evidenced insofar as the divine is intrinsically identified with
both justice and truth. Justice, here, is personified in Dike and its sub-agents.
Likewise, Parmenides goddess is Aletheia, the goddess truth. Furthermore, in the
fragments the divine is disclosed as not-being, or arche, explicitly as divine law. This
divine law that binds being must necessarily signify the otherwise than being, for
being cannot bind itself. As such, the goddess’ revelation of divine law as otherwise
than being is also the self-revelation of the divine in general as otherwise than being;
as the always-absent arche of being.

I have argued that Parmenides poem discloses a radical differentiation between being
and what gets called not-being. Parmenides carefully distances being and not-being,
keeping them in their radical difference. Parmenides, furthermore, is in agreement
with the previous pre-Socratic thinkers and can be seen to develop this thinking to its
logical conclusion. Thus, the distinction between being and the arche that arises in the
pre-Socratic quest for arche shows itself in Parmenides as a stark and un-bridgeable
gap between the concept of being and not-being.

A phenomenological interpretation of the fragments:
Whether it gets called the apeiron, logos, or ‘that which is not’, the Pre-Socratic
thinkers addressed all take as their ultimate problem the question of the arche.
Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, each priorities the question of arche in such
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a way that the philosophical notion of being is characterized as a secondary
phenomenon. In each case, being is only considered after, or within the context of, a
characterization of the arche.

In this quest for the arche a radical difference emerges between arche and being. Each
of these thinkers, in their own way, characterize being as essentially a presence that is
bound and steered by the arche. Accordingly, the arche is characterized as an alwaysabsence; a non-physical ground, or, the otherwise than being. The arche the preSocratics found, as such, is impossible to grasp initially except through the negation
of presence, or, by disclosing the otherwise than being as an always-absence.

Nonetheless, all three are in agreement as to how this ground shows itself to humans,
namely; through the concepts of binding, steering and purpose. Binding, herein,
signifies the delimitation of being in its actualization or activities. Likewise, steering
shows how the arche shows itself as the significance and coherence within physis as it
can be understood. Finally, then, the arche is disclosed as purpose itself. This purpose
in itself, as such, is the essential character of the arche as it can be thought and as it
shows itself.

The ways in which the arche shows itself are intrinsically linked to what it is to be
human, and especially to the three aspects of human thinking disclosed in pre-Socratic
thought. If we take Parmenides’ poem as a point of origin, we find three implicit
characterizations of human thinking.

The realm of doxa is described as the way of human thinking that prioritizes how
physis appears to the senses. This thinking views opposites as real or actual and
measures the truth of things according to their appearance and seeming disappearance.
The goddess reveals to Parmenides that the essence of this way of thinking is a twoheadedness; thinking that being and not-being are the same and not the same. 33 Thus,
the essence of this way of thinking is not simply the prioritization of physical
appearances, but further, thinking that prioritizes the physical and thus seeks an
abstract unifying ground of the physical.
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Heraclitus also discusses this way of thinking via appearances, and thinking founded
upon the prioritization of the physical. Herein, Heraclitus provides scathing attacks
upon thinking via appearances, and further, links this to the prioritization of the
physical and the question of the constitution of entities in their presence (being).

The second way of thinking disclosed by Parmenides is that of the truth of being. This
way of thinking is the first revealed by the goddess, but is secondary in terms of
priority. This second way of thinking, in Parmenides, is the proper way of thinking
being in relation to entities and the purely abstract idea of the being in general. In
Heraclitus, this second way of thinking is utilized in relation to a differing focus, the
intelligibility of physis as an activity of being, but nonetheless addresses being, in its
truth, in its coherence and significance for human thought. Thus, both Parmenides and
Heraclitus constitute this second way of thinking as the truth of being for humans, or,
the way in which humans, in our being, understand being.

The third and final way of thinking in Parmenides poem refers to not-being. This way
of thinking can be called the truth of the arche and is characterized as entirely
otherwise than human. Equally, in Heraclitus this way of the truth of arche is
described as entirely otherwise than human and shows itself only via indications 34 .

These three potential ways of thinking, as such, indicates two primary potentialities of
being-human. The first of these can be called everydayness, or, the thinking that
prioritizes appearances and thus the physical. Here, everydayness as a way of beinghuman will result in two ways of thinking about physis. The first is thinking that the
real is determinable by what appears to be physically present to us. The second is
metaphysical thinking: the thinking of being as the presence of entities, and further,
thinking of being as the unifying ground of everything. In this respect, a semblance of
the truth of being is thought via everydayness, but it is a semblance marked by a
failure to grasp the arche.

Thus, the first potentiality of being-human is essentially the actualization or praxis of
human existence (being-human). This potentiality of being-human is, for the most
part, the way humans are in our being. In this way, the first potentiality of beinghuman is both improper in relation to the arche, and yet at the same time, is the truth
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of being-human. The truth of being, of being-human, is thus presence, or, a way of
being that presents entities in their being. At the same time, the truth of being is also
entirely improper, for as Parmenides’ goddess indicates; it is impossible for human
beings to grasp that which is not present.

There is however, a second potentiality for being-human, namely; the potentiality to
seek the arche or to recognize the otherwise than being. Parmenides poem exemplifies
the first dimension of this potentiality of being-human. For, the truth standing-under
being is revealed as the arche, indicated via divine communication. Likewise, this
potentiality of being-human is characterized by Heraclitus as the quest to grasp the
arche; the purpose that steers all things. The truth of the arche is only disclosed via the
way the arche shows itself to humans as the revelation of indications. Further,
Heraclitus also posits this potentiality as an actuality of human existence: ‘ethos for
being-human is our daemonion’ – the divine voice presented in thinking the arche.

The construction of the notion of being-human in the Pre-Socratics shown here in its
twofold potentiality thus revolves around the unity and difference between being and
the ground of being. The unity of being and arche signifies nothing more or less than
the truth of being-human insofar as humans present being as that which is. The human
understanding of being and being-human produces an inauthentic unity of being and
thinking wherein thinking is subsumed under presence and therein becomes a kind of
thinking that is determined by presence.

However, the proper disclosed in pre-Socratic thought is proper thinking itself, or,
thinking the arche. Herein, the arche is disclosed as the proper, or, thinking the
otherwise than being which is, essentially, thinking that has no relation to being
whatsoever. The problem of attempting to communicate the essence of thinking is
insurmountable for humans (in our being), for we cannot think without thinking
being. Nonetheless, the arche as it is disclosed in pre-Socratic thought is essentially
pointing towards the otherwise than being as pure thinking that shows itself as the
truth, ethos, and ultimately, as the arche (the proper). This potentiality for humans, in
our being, to grasp or to be gifted with the understanding of the otherwise than being,
and further, to be directed by this ground in our living, is precisely what is sought in
pre-Socratic thinking.
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The Meaning of Religion:

The thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides has disclosed indications of
the meaning of Religion in a phenomenological sense. Here, the essence of the
meaning of Religion shows itself as the relation between humans (in our being) and
the arche. I would like to suggest, in conclusion, that there are two ways of
determining the meaning of religion as a relationship with the arche. In the first
instance, we can determine the meaning of religion as it is expressed in a variety of
ways through human existence, or, insofar as human thinking relates to the arche
through the activities of living. Alternatively, it is also possible to determine the
meaning of religion in its basic character of ‘belonging-to’ the being of humans, or,
inasmuch as we can determine religion as a phenomenon of being-human.

In the first case, the meaning of Religion is construed via the possibilities of how
humans can think the arche as that which is related to. In this respect, there are at least
three possible ways of constituting the arche as that which is related to in religion.
These three possibilities are as follows: 1) the arche is constituted as an entity
accessible to experience, 2) the arche is constituted as being or the truth of being
itself, and 3) the arche is constituted as not-being.

The first expression of religion is what Parmenides called the realm of doxa where
humans seek the ground of being through appearances and sensory experience. The
ground of being is conceived of as an entity or entities within physis; as entities with
the character of being. Here, as Heraclitus shows, the meaning of Religion is a
relating to the arche as present: ‘they talk to these statues as if one were to hold
conversation with houses, in their ignorance…’ 35 Thus, the meaning of Religion
indicated shows itself initially via thinking the ground of being as an entity within
being.

The second expression of religion is what might be called meta-physical thinking, or,
thinking that arrives at the determination of the arche only after already providing a
determination of physis and the truth of being. The danger of this expression of
religion is that the concept of the arche may be reduced to nothing more than an
explanation of physis as the truth of being and the unity of being as a whole.
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Therefore, the second expression of religion indicated shows itself as the
determination of the ground of being as being-itself.

The third expression of religion can be called the quest for the ground of being.
However, inasmuch as Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides determine being as
being-thought, the primary sense of the arche will refer somehow to the ground of
human thinking. In this way, religion can be expressed as a relation to the ground of
being-human as the entity that thinks, and in thinking acts, and in acting lives. This
third expression of religion can be unpacked in two further ways. We can say first,
that this expression of religion begins with a denial or negation of the possibility of
accessing the ground of being through the physical, or even the abstract notion of
being as the unified ground of the physical. Alternatively, this relationship is
expressed insofar as human thinking first searches for the ground of thinking. Here,
religion is expressed in a positive sense as a quest for the truth, meaning, and purpose
that is the ground of thinking, and yet, is otherwise than being.

This third expression of religion discloses what we might call the proper meaning of
religion, and at the same time, indicates how (and in what sense) religion belongs to
the being of humans. The phenomenon of religion, as such, belongs-to humans in our
being insofar as we are capable of directing our selves towards the ground of our
thinking, and therein, of constituting our lives in relation to arche as the truth, as
meaning, and as purpose. We could say then, that religion is founded upon the being
of humans insofar as we necessarily seek and actualize in our living both meaning and
purpose through a relationship with the ground of our being.
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